



'They are not Muslims': A critical discourse analysis of the Ahmadiyya sect issue in Indonesia

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Abstract

This article examines discourse presentations of the Ahmadiyya sect (a self-defined sect of Islam) as created in texts produced by the Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam*/the FPI). The FPI considers Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect because the sect recognises its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a new prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad. This teaching is in sharp contradiction to the belief of the majority of Muslims who believe that Muhammad is the seal of prophethood. This study aims to reveal the discourse strategies employed and discourse topics presented by the FPI in its written and spoken texts when presenting Ahmadiyya. The data analysed are two speeches delivered and two articles written by the FPI's chairman, Habib Rizieq Shihab. The critical discourse analysis (CDA) theoretical framework employed in this study is based on Van Dijk's 'ideological square', namely positive self- and negative other presentations. The findings of the study reveal that Ahmadiyya is depicted negatively as 'the non-believers of Islam', 'the hijacker of Islam', 'the enemy of Islam', and 'the traitor/betrayer of Islam', while Shihab has portrayed the FPI as 'the tolerant Islamic group'

Keywords

Ahmadiyya, blasphemy, critical discourse analysis (CDA), deviant sect, discriminatory discourses, discourse strategies, Indonesia, Islam, Islamic Defender Front, positive and negative presentations, religious minority group

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Introduction

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) as an analytical tool is a powerful means for revealing social and political issues, and therefore it has been extensively used to investigate social issues of power, power abuse, discrimination and social inequality and injustice. One of the strengths of CDA is its ability to reveal how certain minority individuals or groups are discriminated against in texts. In CDA, certain individuals or groups are discursively discriminated against when they are presented or depicted negatively using discriminatory discourse strategies (Blackledge, 2005; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Flowerdew et al., 2002; KhosraviNik, 2009; Van Dijk, 1993b, 1998, 2002; Wodak and Reisigl, 1999, 2001, 2007). The discriminatory discourse strategies, such as ‘metaphor’, ‘scapegoating’ and ‘lexicalisation’, are effectively used to construct prejudice, stereotype and other negative presentations (Flowerdew et al., 2002; Van Dijk, 1989b, 1993a). The victims of discriminatory discourses are mainly minority groups (Flowerdew et al., 2002). In texts, the text producers always present themselves positively and depict others negatively. This is popularly known as the ‘ideological square’ (Van Dijk, 2006b).

Many studies have been carried out previously and revealed that discriminatory discourses are deliberately created to discriminate against immigrants (see e.g. Belmonte et al., 2010; Blackledge, 2006; Cheng, 2013; Flowerdew et al., 2002; Ndhlovu, 2008; Rasinger, 2010; Smith and Waugh, 2008), refugees and asylum seekers (see Baker et al., 2008; Goodman, 2008; KhosraviNik, 2009), ethnic groups or racism (see Van Dijk, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000a,b,c, 2004; Wodak and Reisigl, 1999, 2001, 2007), and Muslims (see Baker, 2012; Izadi and Biria, 2007).

Immigrants from the Chinese mainland in Hong Kong, for example, are discursively discriminated against by labelling them negatively as ‘poor’, ‘dirty’, ‘unemployable’, ‘uneducated’, ‘uncivilised’ and ‘lazy’ people. They are also metaphorically presented – using the metaphor of water – as ‘influx’, ‘flood’ and ‘burden’, which could bring a tremendous social negative impact to Hong Kong society (Flowerdew et al., 2002). In the United States, immigrants are metaphorically presented as illegal aliens who are ‘dangerous’, ‘threatening’, ‘predatory’, ‘barbaric’, ‘numerous’, ‘unstoppable’, ‘vengeful’, ‘unpleasant’ and ‘disagreeable’ (Smith and Waugh, 2008). Rasinger (2010) also investigates the discriminatory discourses against immigrants from Eastern Europe who came to England. In the *Cambridge Evening News*, the immigrants are portrayed as groups who commit crimes and cause conflicts and problems. By using the strategy of social exclusion, the immigrants in Australia are socially excluded by Australian politicians by establishing the discourse of ‘difference’, saying that Australian culture is superior to the cultures of the immigrants and the immigrants cannot assimilate with this ‘high culture’ (Cheng, 2013).

Baker et al. (2008) examine the negative presentation of ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘immigrants’ and Muslims (RASIM) created in the UK press. In their analysis, RASIM are accused of being troublemakers and causing problems related to the economy and security. Similarly, the RASIM in British newspapers are negatively presented as the creators of human problems (KhosraviNik, 2009). Similar discriminatory discourse practices against asylum seekers are also found in a study conducted by Goodman (2008). According to Goodman (2008), the discrimination against the asylum seekers is considered to be an effort to maintain social cohesion of the British people. In this context, asylum seekers are

considered to be a group of people who can destroy British social cohesion. The concept underlying this social cohesion relies upon a racist assumption.

Negative discourse presentation against Muslims is reported in Izadi and Biria's (2007) work. They investigate the discourse of the US policies on the Iranian nuclear programme as elaborated in the headlines of the three most powerful American newspapers, namely, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *The Wall Street Journal*. By using the strategy of collocation, the three newspapers present Iran and Muslims negatively, as a 'threat' and a 'source of terrorism'. Negative presentation against Muslims is also found in Baker's (2012) analysis of newspaper texts published by the British press from 1998 to 2009, such as *The Star*, *The Mirror*, *The Sun*, *The Daily Mail* and *The Daily Express*. In his finding, the word 'Muslims' is collocated with extreme belief terms such as 'extremist(s)', 'militant(s)' and 'fundamentalist(s)'.

This study examines discriminatory discourses against a religious minority group, namely Ahmadiyya, which receives little attention in previous discriminatory discourse studies. While discriminatory discourses against, for example, immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and Muslims have been mostly triggered by political and economic motives, the discriminatory discourses against the Ahmadiyya sect are based on religious or theological motives. The sect is accused of having ruffled the core teaching of Islam, namely the seal of prophethood, by recognising its founder (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) as a new prophet of Islam after Muhammad.

With regard to Ahmadiyya, some people state that discrimination against the sect is a violation against the freedom of religion and a form of intolerance. According to Freedman and Tiburzi (2012), the violent attacks against Ahmadiyya in Indonesia are caused by the absence of full protection of the government to protect religious minority groups from any violent attacks. Such lack of protection is reinforced because the Indonesian government has not seriously acted to establish human rights and freedom of religion. Muktiono (2012) argues that less protection can be seen in the weak law enforcement to punish individuals or groups that create violent acts against Ahmadiyya followers. Khanif (2009) also argues that despite the fact that Indonesia has enforced the freedom of religion in the constitution and some laws, minority groups still experience discrimination. Furthermore, discrimination against religious minority groups (e.g. Ahmadiyya) cannot be separated from the emergence of powerful Islamic interest groups at the beginning of the reformation era (1998), aiming 'to dominate the legislative process, to exert strict control over Muslims' private lives, and to diminish the rights of minorities' (Kraince, 2009: 1). These studies have revealed that discrimination against Ahmadiyya is the violation of religious freedom and it produces intolerant actions, but an investigation of how the Ahmadiyya sect is discursively portrayed in texts is under-developed.

Besides expanding the application of CDA by investigating discriminatory discourses against any religious minority group as the objective of this study, it also contributes to providing a better understanding of the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia, especially regarding how the sect is presented in texts or discourses projected by an Indonesian Islamic organisation, namely the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI). This study is guided by the following question:

How is the Ahmadiyya sect presented by the FPI and what discourse strategies have been employed?

Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

Ahmadiyya was first established in India in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. In 1914, 6 years after the death of its founder in 1908, this sect was split into two factions, namely, Ahmadiyya Qadian and Ahmadiyya Lahore. In that year, there was an irreconcilable difference among the Ahmadiyya followers that led them to separate. It concerned an understanding about the position of Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer or a prophet (Fathoni, 2002). The Qadiani recognises the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad after the Prophet Muhammad, whereas the Lahore claims that this founder of Ahmadiyya is just a reformer, and that Muhammad is the seal of prophethood.

The sect has been present in Indonesia since the 1920s, from around 20 years before the country gained its independence in 1945 (Burhani, 2013). The Ahmadiyya Qadian established the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (*Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia*/the JAI) in 1925 and the Ahmadiyya Lahore founded the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (*Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia*/the GAI) in 1928. These two Indonesian Ahmadiyya groups have the same belief as their international organisations.

Due to this prophethood claim, Ahmadiyya followers, especially the JAI, have been the target of some legal proclamations. In 1980 and 2005, the Indonesian Council of Clerics issued religious decrees (*fatwa*) that consider Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect and its followers as non-believers, infidels and perverted. The first *fatwa* only addressed the JAI, and the second *fatwa* addressed both the JAI and the GAI. In 2008, the Indonesian government issued a joint ministerial decree that considered the JAI's teaching to be deviated from the core Islamic teaching and it raised social conflicts in some parts of Indonesian territory.

The number of Ahmadiyya followers is small compared to the majority Muslims. According to the national head of the JAI, Abdul Basit, as cited by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013), there are only 300,000 to 400,000 JAI followers in Indonesia. The followers of the GAI are not well documented, and the numbers could be much smaller than the JAI. According to Mulyono, the secretary of the GAI (2013, personal communication), there is no precise number of the GAI followers available because they have never been counted or documented. The reason is that the GAI does not concentrate on recruiting followers but focuses more on disseminating its Islamic teaching. It can be said that the total number of the Ahmadiyya followers is less than 1% of the total population of Indonesian Muslims.

Although the number of its followers is so small, the Ahmadiyya's Islamic interpretation is considered to be dangerous for the faith of Muslims and it can possibly create a social conflict. The recognition of a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad is regarded as a religious defamation and it ruffles a very important belief of Muslims that recognises Muhammad as the seal of prophethood.

Due to this 'deviation', the followers of the sect, especially the JAI, have been the victims of some violent attacks. In 2011, the worst attack against Ahmadiyya followers occurred in Cikeusik, District of Banten – the western end of Java Island (Intolerance turns deadly in Indonesia, 2011; Komnas Temukan Kejanggalan, 2011). The violent attack, which was perpetrated by a group of 1500 radical Muslims, killed three Ahmadiyya followers and severely injured five more (Mietzner, 2012). According to Kraince (2009),

the violence against the sect began in July 2005 after the Indonesian Council of clerics released the religious decree considering Ahmadiyya followers as the perpetrators of blasphemy. Other forms of discrimination against the Ahmadiyya followers are the closing of places of worship, inequality in public service and the burning of their houses (Dipa, 2014; Hasani, 2009; Nugraha, 2013).

Islam in Indonesia

The issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesian cannot be separated from the discourse of Islam. Islam for Indonesian people has been an inseparable aspect of their daily life both in the traditional and contemporary senses. Before independence in 1945, when the archipelago was still named *Nusantara*, Islam had been an inclusive religion providing the people with moral values that had influenced their social, political and cultural lives. At this time, the number of Muslims became larger than those belonging to the long-established religions/beliefs, such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Animism. It is not surprising that Islam, Islamic groups or the greater Muslim communities have been involved in shaping the establishment of Indonesia and of its people. This spread of Islam in *Nusantara*, according to Ricklefs (2008), is one of the most significant processes in Indonesian history.

At present, Indonesia is a country where the majority of people have identified themselves as Muslims (Lee, 2004), and it is the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia recognises six official religions, namely, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Catholicism and Confucianism. Among these religions, Islam constitutes the largest majority of the population at around 88.2% in 2000 and 87.20% in 2005.¹ Even though Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, Islam is not the ideology of the state. The founding fathers of the country have agreed to make *Pancasila*² the sole ideology of the state.

Not only is the role of Islam seen from the provision of moral values and identity formation for Indonesian people, but the role of religion was also apparent in seeding the spirit of nationalism and independence against colonialism. The movement of the Islamic nationalists to struggle for Indonesian Independence had started 100 years ago, dating back to the days of five Muslim heroes – Prince Diponegoro, Imam Bonjol, Sultan Babullah in Ternate, Teuku Cik Di Tiro in Aceh and Sultan Hasanuddin in Makassar – who tried to fight against the Dutch colonial power. At that time, ‘Islam was the focus of movement against Dutch colonial power’ (Kingsbury, 2002: 10).

The role of Islam can also be identified in its influence on Indonesian politics. Throughout the history of Indonesia, especially in modern times from the beginning of 20th century to the present, Indonesian politics has been connected to debates and even confrontation regarding the establishment of the Islamic state, the insertion of Islamic laws in the constitution and the permeation of Islamic teachings into social life. The establishment of an Islamic state is attempted through not only a democratic or constitutional way, but also a more radical way. In the period of the 1950s to the 1960s, the radical movement was attempted by ‘the Territory of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army’ (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* or popularly known as DI/TII) and backed by guerrilla-experienced fighters. The DI/TII was the Islamic movement that used military power to

establish Islamic rules in the newly born Republic of Indonesia. The movement was ‘one of the greatest worries for the government of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly in the period after 1950’ (Boland, 1982: 54).

The role of Muslim communities was also apparent at the beginning of the Indonesian reformation era³ in 1998. The reformation era is ‘a political stage’ for Muslim groups to regain a greater role in public life. In previous eras, particularly under Soeharto, such a role was suppressed (Butt, 2010; Hosen, 2007). This attempt could be seen in the effort to reinsert ‘Jakarta Charter’⁴ (Fealy, 2004: 108) in the four instances of amendment of the Indonesian Constitution from 1999 to 2002 by Islamic political parties, groups and Islamic communities. Additionally, the issuing of *Perda Syariah*⁵ also unveils this deliberate attempt (Parsons and Mietzners, 2009). This era is also marked by the establishment of various Islamic groups that disseminate the idea of Islamic laws (*sharia*) (Fealy and White, 2008; Salim and Azra, 2003).

In certain situations, however, Islam is sometimes used by certain individuals or groups to legitimise their violent acts against others – a behaviour that is popularly called *Membela Agama dan Tuhan* (Defending the Religion and God). In this context, religion reveals its face as one projecting horror, terror and a threat to anyone who has a different religious understanding from the holder of the mainstream understanding. The horror and threat perpetrated by such groups of people have clearly shown Islam to be a ‘non-peaceful’ religion and one that is a forceful power to discriminate against and violate, for instance, religious minority groups. This happens not only at the physical level, such as with assaults, but also at the discourse level.

Blasphemy and religious freedom

In Indonesian laws and constitutions, the issue of Ahmadiyya deals with laws and constitutions that recognise blasphemy and religious freedom. Some Islamic organisations that encourage the banning of the sect, such as the FPI, *Hizbut Tahrir* and the Islamic people forum (*Forum Umat Islam*/the FUI), mainly use the law of blasphemy to address the Ahmadiyya issue. Those who support Ahmadiyya, especially non-government organisations (such as the Setara Institute and the Wahid Institute), use religious freedom laws to defend Ahmadiyya.

In 1965, the first Indonesian President, Soekarno (1945–1966), issued Presidential Decree Number 1/1965, concerning the prevention throughout the country of blasphemy or religious defamation. This law was based on the belief that religious defamation was seen as a threat to national security, to the goals of the 1945 revolution and to Indonesian national development. Essentially, Presidential Decree Number 1/1965 was used as a legal recognition to prevent some groups of people from defaming one or more of the six official religions. The issuing of a joint decree in 2008 about Ahmadiyya was based on this blasphemy law.

With regard to religious freedom, on 18 August 1945, one day after proclaiming its independence, Indonesia adopted its first constitution, called the 1945 Constitution. Religious freedom is stipulated in the constitution under the heading ‘Religion’, as in Chapter XI, Article 29, Paragraphs 1 and 2. Religious freedom is then reinforced by the issuing of some laws. In 1999, the Indonesian government issued Law Number 39

concerning human rights to provide a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, as stipulated in Article 22 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the law. A year later, on 18 August 2000, the Indonesian government enacted the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution to reinforce religious freedom. The amendment introduced several new articles, including Articles 28E, 28I and 28J, which provide details on the guarantee, by which the freedom of religion and belief is integrated with other rights. Religious freedom was extended further to include the individual's civil and political rights. The extension led to the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), issued by the United Nations (*Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa*), into Law Number 12/2005, especially in Article 18. By this ratification, Indonesia is expected to fully implement the international standard on religious freedom and include such freedom as a part of international probity and tolerance.

However, this religious freedom is not totally free as in a Western sense, but it should be restricted by laws. The Indonesian government argues that it is necessary for the restriction to remain in place because unrestricted freedom may pose social problems associated with morality, public order and security, violation of human rights and defamation of the official religions (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013). The restriction can be found in some of the following features, namely, Article 28J in the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 12/2005 about the ratification of ICCPR (Article 18, para. 3) and Law Number 39/1999 about human rights (Articles 70 and 73). Furthermore, the restriction is also necessary to protect the official religions from blasphemous teaching.

The FPI and the banning of Ahmadiyya

The FPI was established on 17 August 1998 in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. It was about 4 months after the downfall of the second president of Indonesia, Soeharto. The declaration of the FPI was attended by a number of Islamic clerics (*ulama*), preachers, Muslim activists and hundreds of Islamic students (*santri*) from the areas of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi.

The FPI strongly considers Ahmadiyya as a perpetrator of blasphemy, and the Islamic interpretation of the sect deviates from the true teaching of Islam. The dissemination of prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad is considered to be an effort to destroy the faith of Indonesian Muslims. To address the Ahmadiyya issue, the FPI has shown its strong concerns by creating texts that disseminate the blasphemous actions of Ahmadiyya.

According to chairman of the FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab, there are at least five problematic issues that distinguish the Ahmadiyya sect from Islam, namely, the prophethood, the holy book, Ahmadiyya as the agent of colonialism, the legality of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia and the achievement of this sect in the Islamic world (Shihab, 2012a). The acknowledgement of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of Islam has been the most controversial issue. Shihab (2012a) argues that 'although the Ahmadiyya followers recognise Prophet Muhammad as the prophet of Islam, but they do not recognise him as the seal of prophethood' (p. 155). According to Shihab (2012a), Ahmadiyya followers also use *Tadzkirah*⁶ as their holy book to replace Al-Quran.⁷

The members of the FPI are reported to have been involved in violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya followers in some Indonesian territories (Hasani and Naipospos, 2011;

Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013; Indonesia: Hard-line Islamic group FPI say they will drive Ahmadiyah out of Tebet, 2015; Indonesia: New mob attack on Ahmadiyya amid sentencing controversy, 2011). In 2012, Ahmadiyya followers in Bandung, West Java, were attacked by members of the FPI in An-Nasir Mosque, where hundreds of Ahmadiyya followers perform *Idul Adha* (Islamic day of sacrifice) prayers and slaughter animals during the day of sacrifice. Members of the FPI raided the mosque on a Thursday night, damaged it and prohibited Ahmadiyya followers from celebrating *Idul Adha* (Dipa, 2012).

Besides perpetrating physical attacks, the FPI's attempt at the dissolution of Ahmadiyya is also carried out by producing written and spoken texts that mostly present this sect negatively. The negative presentations are apparent in texts created by Habib Rizieq Shihab. He has delivered two speeches entitled *Kesesatan Ahmadiyah/The Heresy of Ahmadiyya* (2013b) and *Bubarkan Ahmadiyya/Disband Ahmadiyya* (2013a) and published two articles entitled *Bubarkan Ahmadiyah atau Revolusi/Disband Ahmadiyya or Revolution* (2012b) and *Ahmadiyah Menipu: Lima Perkara Tolak Ahmadiyah/Ahmadiyya Deceives: Five Reasons to Reject Ahmadiyya* (Shihab, 2012a). In these texts, Ahmadiyya is presented as the 'non-believer of Islam', the 'hijacker of Islam', the 'enemy of Islam' and the 'traitor/betrayer of Islam'. On the other hand, Shihab depicts the FPI positively as a tolerant Islamic group.

The non-believers of Islam

The most salient negative presentation of Ahmadiyya is the creation of the discourse of *kafir* (non-believers). The discourse of *kafir* is constructed through the use of collocation strategy. Collocation is defined as the deliberate co-occurrence of one word with other words, which are repeated frequently in texts (Baker, 2012). Collocation is found in the interview between Abdul Halim, a journalist of *Suara Islam* (the Voice of Islam), and Shihab, entitled *Bubarkan Ahmadiyya atau Revolusi* (Disbanding Ahmadiyya or Revolution) (Shihab, 2012b). In this interview, the word Ahmadiyya is frequently collocated with the word *kafir*:

Jika hari ini, baru tiga kafir Ahmadiyya yang dibunuh, mungkin besok atau lusa aka ada ribuan kafir Ahmadiyya yang disembelih umat Islam.

(Shihab, 2012b: 219)

(Today, there are only three *kafir* Ahmadiyya killed (referring to the Cikeusik incident in 2011), tomorrow or a day after tomorrow, there would be thousands of *kafir* Ahmadiyya slaughtered by Muslims.)

Another statement as follows:

Ini kan ajaran yang berbahaya! Kalau ke depan kafir Ahmadiyah punya kekuasaan dan kekuatan, niscaya mereka akan bantai umat Islam dan umat beragama lain sesuai dengan amanat kitab sucinya.

(Shihab, 2012b: 220)

(This is a dangerous teaching! If the *kafir* Ahmadiyya has authority and power in the future, of course, they will massacre Muslims and the followers of other religions based on the message in their holy book.)

To exacerbate the negative image of the Ahmadiyya followers as non-believers, the use of the word 'slaughtered' is selected to dehumanise and portray them as animals. The word 'slaughter' (as shown in the first excerpt) is commonly used to refer to the way an animal is killed. The image of the non-believers of Islam gets worse by investing the Ahmadiyya followers with animal characteristics and qualifying them as animals, such as goats or cattle. The use of the 'animal metaphor' (Santa Ana, 1999), or the dehumanisation strategy (Bar-Tal, 1989), aims at dehumanising others as non-human entities.

Another negative presentation to portray Ahmadiyya as non-believers is created through the 'othering' strategy. The othering strategy aims to constitute 'in-group' versus 'out-group', where the members of the 'out-group' are excluded (excluding Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community). Such a strategy is popularly known as 'ideological polarisation' (Van Dijk, 2006a: 378), and it is used to create a social distance between individuals who belong to the 'in-group' and 'out-group'. The members of out-groups are those characterised with negative attitudes and behaviours, while the members of in-groups are those who have positive attitudes.

By using deictic expression, the Ahmadiyya sect is excluded from the Muslim community. Deictic expressions or *deixes* are indexical expressions that are related to various situational features (Chilton, 2004) or are context-dependant pronouns (Van Dijk, 1993b). One of the expressions is person *deixis*, which uses personal pronouns, such as 'we' (our/us) and 'they' (their/them), in order to build a dichotomy. One of the functions of this deictic expression is to create a social demarcation by categorising others as individuals or groups that cannot be assimilated with 'us'. The 'othering' strategy can be identified in the following statements (Shihab, 2013b): *Tempat ibadah mereka haram kita sebut sebagai Masjid* (Their worship place is illegitimate, we call it a mosque), *Mereka telah menodai aqidah kita* (They have defamed our faith), *Mereka sudah menghancurkan tatanan dan sistem yang ada dalam syariat Islam* (They have destroyed rules and systems, which have been established in Islamic *Sharia*), *Maka dari itu, wajib bagi umat Islam untuk menolak mereka* (That is the way, it is an obligation for Muslims [us] to reject them), and *Mereka tidak berhak menggunakan simbol Islam* (They do not have a right to use Islamic symbols). These expressions aim to reinforce the distinctions between Muslims and the Ahmadiyya followers as the non-believers of Islam.

The lack of belief of Ahmadiyya is then regarded as a potential danger for Indonesian Muslims. The danger is echoed using the strategy of scare tactics to arouse panic emotions among the majority Muslims. The scare tactic is achieved 'by exaggerating the role of particular individuals or groups as sources of danger in order to create threat and panic to the members of majority' (Flowerdew et al., 2002: 328). This can be observed in *Ini (Ahmadiyah) kafir jadi-jadian yang jauh lebih berbahaya dari kafir-kafir asli* (These [Ahmadiyya people] are deliberately false infidels who are much more dangerous than true infidels) (Shihab, 2013b). The Ahmadiyya followers (false infidels) are considered

to be more dangerous than the followers of other religions (true infidels), such as Christians and Buddhists. It is because the followers of other religions have their own faith, prophet and holy book. Christians and Buddhists, for example, are not considered a risk as they adhere to and implement their own beliefs but do not ruffle the Islamic teaching, whereas Ahmadiyya destroys the true Islamic teaching.

The scare tactic is then reinforced by revealing another potential danger brought by Ahmadiyya. The false prophet with his deviant Islamic teaching not only destroys the true faith of Islam, but can influence Muslims negatively to follow the deviant teaching and take them to hell (*neraka*) in the afterlife: *Nabi palsu itu urusan akherat* (the false prophet is the affair of the afterlife) (Shihab, 2013b). The deviant teaching of Ahmadiyya has negative impact and potentially dangerous consequence to Muslims, both in this world and in afterlife.

The hijacker of Islam

The discourse of ‘hijacking of Islam’ is constructed through the use of metaphor. Metaphorical expression is the rhetorical strategy employed to attach certain characteristics of particular entities (source semantic domain) to other entities (target semantic domain) (Santa Ana, 1999). Shihab attaches to Ghulam Ahmad and his followers the negative characteristics of ‘false police officers’ and ‘false electronic goods’. The sect, according to Shihab, has performed the *so-called* ‘copyright infringement’ by ‘hijacking’ Islam deliberately.

Ahmadiyya, according to Shihab (2013a), has hijacked the true Islamic teaching. The founder and followers of the sect claim to be part of Islam, but they violate a very basic principle of Islamic teaching, namely, the seal of prophethood. Due to this violation, Ahmadiyya is considered to be deviating far from the principles of Islamic teaching. Ghulam Ahmad, who is seen as the new prophet of Islam by Ahmadiyya, is strongly considered as a false prophet who had carried out negative conducts, such as deception, piracy and manipulation. Therefore, they do not have the right to claim to be Muslims and may not perform Islamic prayers. The Ahmadiyya followers’ claim as Muslims is a kind of falsification.

The metaphor of ‘hijacker of Islam’ can be found in the following analogical statements presented by Shihab (2013b). In the statement following, the false prophet is comparably depicted as a false policeman:

Kalau ada warga sipil biasa yang memakai seragam polisi, dia pakai atribut polisi, memakai pangkat polisi, padahal dia bukan Polisi, ditangkap tidak? Jelas ditangkap, polisi palsu, polisi gadungan. Itu dipidana.

(If there is a person who wears a police uniform, he uses police attributes, while, in fact, he is not a policeman, will he be arrested? Of course, he will. He is a false policeman. That is a crime.)

In the above excerpt, Ghulam Ahmad is metaphorically associated with a false policeman who has performed an illegal action. He uses Islamic attributes and claims himself

as the Islamic prophet after Muhammad, but in fact he has ruffled the teaching of Islam, especially the seal of prophethood. The recognition of a new prophet after Muhammad is regarded as a crime.

The metaphor is then strongly reinforced by comparing the false prophet with the actor of copyright infringement of a particular brand of product. In the excerpt below, Ahmadiyya is considered to have hijacked the label or 'brand' of Islam. The negative presentation is reinforced by selecting some words containing negative meaning, such as 'forgery', 'piracy', 'copyright infringement' and 'fraud':

Begitu juga kalau kita punya pabrik TV (televisi), barangnya bagus, kualitas bagus and model bagus. Orang lain lalu produksi, dia ambil merek Sony tanpa izin, persis seperti yang asli, dia jual ke pasar, Pabrik Sony yang asli pasti tahu ... kira-kira menuntut tidak? Lapor polisi, ditangkap tidak? Tentu saja ditangkap. Kenapa? Karena pemalsuan, pembajakan, pelanggaran hak cipta, penipuan...

(Shihab, 2013b)

(Likewise, if someone has a television manufacturer, it has a good quality and model and names his product with a particular brand. Someone else also produces the same products and he uses exactly the same brand without any permission from the original owner of the brand, and then he sell (the products) to the market. When the original owner finds out, will the original owner sue the hijacker or not? If the owner reports it to the police, will the police catch the actor of copyright infringement or not? Yes, definitely. Why? Because this is forgery, piracy, copyright infringement, and fraud...)

The two excerpts above clearly reveal that Ghulam Ahmad is metaphorically associated with the negative characters of 'false police officer' and someone who is guilty of a 'copyright infringement' of a particular brand. By claiming themselves as belonging to Islam, Ghulam Ahmad and his followers have conducted illegal and criminal actions. Ahmadiyya followers are presented as people who have taken over Islam as their religion by committing illegal acts. They have practised some Islamic obligations, but they manipulate Islam by recognising a new prophet of Islam after Muhammad. Through such manipulation, they do not have the right to use Islam as their religious label.

The enemy of Islam

In presenting Ahmadiyya as the enemy of Islam, Shihab (2013a) creates a discourse of war in his fiery speech entitled *Bubarkan Ahmadiyah* (Disband Ahmadiyya) using the discourse strategy of lexicalisation. Such a strategy is employed to create war-nuanced expressions. He analogises the FPI's attempt to disseminate the banning of Ahmadiyya and violent acts against the sect as the war against the enemy of Islam. The FPI's attempts may direct the cognition or mind of the hearers/audiences as a call for a holy war (*jihad*). The use of the slogan 'commanding good deed and forbidding evil' to combat Ahmadiyya deliberately depicts Ahmadiyya negatively as 'evil' that has to be combated in order to maintain the purity of Islam. The Ahmadiyya followers are delegitimised or dehumanised; they are considered to be individuals with an evil character. The discourse

construction of Ahmadiyya as ‘the enemy of Islam’ justifies violent acts against the sect as a divine call, the norm and therefore permissible.

In his fiery speech, Shihab (2013a) calls for Islamic groups and the Indonesian Muslim community to fight against Ahmadiyya. There are a number of war-nuanced words and phrases, such as *perjuangan* (struggle against), *membela Allah* (defending God), *membela Nabi* (defending the prophet), *revolusi* (revolution), *mati di tangan Allah* (die in the hands of God) and *menumpahkan darah* (shed blood). Some of the expressions can be found in the following statements: *Kita tidak akan pernah mundur dalam perjuangan untuk membubarkan Ahmadiyya* (We will never retreat in the struggle to disband Ahmadiyya) and *Bubarkan Ahmadiyya atau Revolusi* (Disband Ahmadiyya or revolution) (Shihab, 2013a).

The struggle against Ahmadiyya, for the FPI, is considered as a way to defend God (*Allah*), the prophet and Islam. The struggle is not an offence against Ahmadiyya, but it is a divine struggle to defend Islam or *jihad*. Shihab argues that dissemination of the disbanding of Ahmadiyya and attacks against its followers are seen as a reaction of Muslims against the sect that has sought to destroy Islam. Ahmadiyya has insulted God and the prophet:

Siap membela agama Allah? Siap membela agama Nabi? Siap membela Islam? Siap mati untuk Allah dan Rasul-Nya? Siap mati untuk Islam?

(Shihab, 2013a)

(Ready to defend Allah’s religion? Ready to defend the prophet’s religion? Ready to defend Islam? Ready to die for Allah and his messengers? Ready to die for Islam?)

In defending Islam, Shihab persuades Indonesian Muslims to give everything for this struggle, even their lives. This persuasion is identified in the following excerpt in the form of interrogative statements: *Siap menumpahkan darah? Siap menyumbang nyawa? Siap mati di tangan Allah?* (Are you ready to shed your blood? Are you ready to donate your lives? Are you ready to die in the hands of God?) (Shihab, 2013a).

The war-nuanced expressions are deliberately selected to arouse the feelings and attention of Muslims to fight against Ahmadiyya, the sect that has been presented as ‘evil’ or ‘the enemy of Islam’. Such a discourse is associated with a divine call for Muslims to carry out *jihad*. *Jihad* against Ahmadiyya followers is not negotiable; it is an obligation for all Muslims to perform it.

The traitor/betrayer of Islam

Negative discourse presentation of the ‘traitor/betrayers’ of Islam is created using the strategy of negative attribution by narrating history about the founder of this sect. According to Flowerdew et al. (2002), negative attribution is a discourse strategy to attribute negative characteristics to certain individuals or social groups. Ghulam Ahmad and his family are attributed with negative characteristics such as the ‘traitor’, ‘liar’ and the ‘agent’ of British imperialism who work for the political interests of the British in

India. Those who work for colonialists are considered to be betrayers. Shihab (2012a, 2013b) creates a story about the loyalty of Ghulam Ahmad's family to the British government in India. Ghulam Ahmad and his family as Muslims, according to Shihab, were exploited or employed by the British in order to alleviate opposition to or resistance of most Indian Muslims against the British's rule:

Mirza Gulam Ahmad ini adalah antek Inggris. Jadi pemerintah Inggris pada saat menjajah India, dia punya kesulitan besar menghadapi umat Islam. Karena di India yang mati-matian menghadapi penjajah itu umat Islam ... lalu Inggris mencari cara untuk memecah belah umat Islam. Dia carilah orang Islam yang bisa dimanfaatkan. Itulah dia Mirza Gulam Ahmad, seorang kurir pada pemerintah Inggris.

(Shihab, 2013b)

(Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the agent of British. When the British invaded India, they had a difficulty to confront Muslims. In India, those who struggled against the imperialists were Muslims ... the British tried to find a way to divide or appease them. They looked for a Muslim who could be exploited; and he was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a courier of the British government.)

It can be understood that those who work for the imperialists are considered to be traitors or betrayers. This discourse presentation can direct the mind of the audience (hearer or reader) to consider that violent acts against Ahmadiyya are part of the struggle against the agents of imperialism. The traitors of Islam are dangerous because they can use Islam manipulatively in order to destroy Islam from within.

The imposition of these negative attributions is a strategy to contest or oppose the claim of prophethood of the Ahmadiyya founder. In doing so, Shihab (2013b) compares good characteristics of a prophet, for example 'honest' and 'trustful', with negative characteristics of a traitor or agent of imperialism, for example 'deceitful' and 'deceptive'. These two categories of characters are strictly opposed. In our general understanding, a prophet is a holy figure who is never contaminated with or responsible for negative conduct in his life, such as cheating or lying. Ghulam Ahmad had these negative characteristics, and therefore he does not meet the criteria to be a prophet:

Ghulam Ahmad adalah pengkhianat. Ada nabi pengkhianat? Semua nabi tidak ada yang pengkhianat... Tidak ada nabi yang penipu... Tidak ada nabi yang pendusta...

(Shihab, 2013b)

Ghulam Ahmad is a traitor. Can a traitor become a prophet? No prophet is a traitor... No prophet is a cheater... No prophet is a liar...

The history of the cooperation between the Ahmadiyya founder and his family in India with British Imperialism is deliberately highlighted to tell people that Ahmadiyya is the betrayer of Islam. This presentation may also be interpreted as the deliberate way to associate Ahmadiyya with foreign political interest. The members of FPI have a strong concern for repudiating every international movement that disseminates liberalism, secularism,

Zionism and Christianisation. They argue that all these transnational movements come from foreign countries (mainly from the United States and Europe) to Indonesia in order to destroy Islam. At this thought, Ahmadiyya is considered to be a part of these movements to demolish the faith of Muslims.

A tolerant Islamic group

While presenting Ahmadiyya negatively, Shihab (2013b) presents his actions and the FPI positively by using the discourse strategy of disclaimer/denial. Disclaimer is verbal denial of discrimination used to avoid a negative impression by listeners or readers (Van Dijk, as cited in Flowerdew et al., 2002). The positive presentation aims to tell people that the FPI is a tolerant Islamic group. Hatred against Ahmadiyya and any violent actions they have created are not seen as violation against the freedom of religion. Shihab denies/disclaims public opinion that the FPI is intolerant by claiming that their actions against Ahmadiyya aim at maintaining and establishing the freedom of the religion of Muslims, which has so far been interrupted by Ahmadiyya. Similarly, Shihab (2013a) also delivers a message that the FPI recognises religious tolerance by not creating violent actions against the followers of others official religions, such as Christianity and Hinduism.

In doing so, Shihab (2013b) finds a clear distinction between other religions – Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism – and Ahmadiyya. Although he categorises all religions and religious groups – other than Islam – as infidels (*kafir*), there is one aspect that distinguishes the treatment of other official religions and Ahmadiyya. The FPI allows other religions to coexist with Islam, which he calls tolerance, but not with Ahmadiyya. This can be identified in the following excerpt:

Kristen punya label. Dia punya agama sendiri, nabi sendiri, kitab suci sendiri, dia tidak mengobok-obok ajaran kita. Begitu juga dengan Budha dan Hindu, biarkan saja mereka menjadi agama. Selama mereka tidak mengganggu kita, kita juga tidak akan pernah mengganggu mereka. Haram kalau kita mengganggu mereka.

(Shihab, 2013b)

(Christianity has a label. They have their own religion, their own prophet, and their own holy book. They do not interfere with our Islamic teaching. Likewise, Hinduism and Buddhism, let them practice their own religion. As long as they do not interfere with us, we will never interfere with them. It is *haram* [unlawful/illegitimate] if we bother them.)

Another similar statement explaining the tolerance of the FPI towards other religions is found in Shihab's (2012a) article text entitled *Ahmadiyah Menipu, Lima Perkara Tolak Ahmadiyah* (Ahmadiyya deceives: Five cases to reject Ahmadiyya). He states that Indonesian Muslims recognise the freedom of religion by allowing the followers of other religions to practise their faith. However, that Muslims do not allow any actions that try to defame Islam and Ahmadiyya is considered one such action. The tolerant attitude underlying Shihab's (2012a) views about the difference between other religions and Ahmadiyya can be seen in the following statement:

Dalam pandangan Islam, bahwa agama lain seperti Kristen, Budha, dan Hindu, memiliki agama dan konsep ajaran sendiri, sehingga mereka mesti dihargai dan dihormati ... Inilah kebebasan beragama. Sedangkan Ahmadiyah mengatasnamakan Islam tapi menyelewengkan ajaran Islam, sehingga mereka sudah menyerang, mengganggu, dan merusak Islam. Itulah penodaan agama.

(Shihab, 2012a: 160)

(In the view of Islam, other religions, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism have their own religion and teaching concept. So, they have to be respected and acknowledged ... This is a freedom of religion. Ahmadiyya and its followers consider themselves as Muslims, but they have distorted the Islamic teaching. So, they have offended, interfered, and destroyed Islam. That is a religious defamation.)

Tolerance towards others by the FPI is disseminated through the acceptance of other religions to co-exist with Islam. In the excerpt above, Shihab provides a definition of religious freedom and religious defamation. He argues that Ahmadiyya belongs to the latter. While presenting Ahmadiyya negatively, the statements above have functioned to constitute the linguistic strategy of denial, disclaimer or avoidance, to disclaim general assumption or accusation of public about the FPI's intolerant attitude. This is to say that the negative attitude against Ahmadiyya is not a form of intolerance, but it is an attempt to defend the true faith of Islam against blasphemy or religious defamation.

Conclusion

Discriminatory discourse presentation is deliberately constructed to present particular groups (mainly minority groups) negatively. A number of discourse strategies, such as metaphor, scapegoating and scare tactics, that were previously employed to create the negative presentations against immigrants, refugees and ethnic groups, are also found in discriminatory discourses against Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. The difference is that discriminatory discourses found in the previous studies are based on political or economic motives, while discrimination against Ahmadiyya is based on religious or theological motives.

The negative presentations against Ahmadiyya may have negative social effects on the Ahmadiyya followers. According to Van Dijk (1989a, 2006b), texts or discourse constructions have cognitive and social functions. Similarly, Fairclough (2003) also argues that texts or discourse presentation can have social effects, with the first effect being on the minds of readers. By reading and interpreting texts, people learn new things that can shape their minds, and it may then influence their attitudes and behaviours, either positively or negatively. The discriminatory discourses against Ahmadiyya may shape and enforce the negative image of Ahmadiyya in the public's minds. Consequently, this shaping may exacerbate the plight experienced by the followers of the sect.

The discriminatory discourses against Ahmadiyya by the FPI may have implications for the implementation of religious practice in Indonesia. Indonesia is known as the country that promotes moderate Islam and tries to accommodate religious differences. Compared to Islam in the Middle East, Islam in Indonesia is relatively peaceful when dealing with religious conflicts. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the country also

guarantees freedom of religion in its laws and constitution. However, the treatment of Ahmadiyya, seen from the attacks against its followers and some decrees associated with it, may be an obstacle for maintaining religious harmony and this may create a negative image of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world.

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Notes

1. See the result of the population survey (Survey Penduduk Antar Sensus/SUPAS) in Hasani (2009).
2. *Pancasila* consists of five principles, that is, 'Believe in One Almighty God', 'Humanity', 'the Unity of Indonesia', 'Democracy' and 'Social Justice'.
3. The *Era Reformasi* (Reformation Era) is marked by the downfall of Soeharto and of his 'New Order' regime by the massive student demonstration together with the civil society protests in 1998. That year on 21 May, Soeharto publicly announced his resignation.
4. The Jakarta Charter was intended to stipulate concerning the principle of 'Belief in One Almighty God' in *Pancasila*. It consists of seven words in the Indonesian language that say *dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya* ('with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise the Islamic laws').
5. *Perda Syariah* is a local regulation issued by the Major, Head of Regent, or Governor who aims at implementing Islamic Laws at provincial and municipality levels. Constitutionally, this local regulation is made possible because of the change in the constitutional system from centralist to decentralist, in the form of *Otonomi Daerah* (Local Autonomy).
6. *Tadzkirah*, by the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), is regarded as the holy book of Ahmadiyya to replace the Al-Qur'an. Some Ahmadiyya followers, meanwhile, consider it as only a book containing information about the life history of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; therefore, it is not a holy book. *Tadzkirah* was compiled by the followers of the sect 27 years after the death of Ghulam Ahmad.
7. Al-Qur'an or the Koran is the holy book of Muslims containing divine revelations sent by God [*Allah*] to the Prophet Muhammad and his followers.

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